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1 Introduction
The concept of vertical foreclosure is central to the stratégie analysis of
vertical intégration and, as such, is an important issue in Industrial Orga-
nization. Following Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), we define it as "the
exclusion that results when unintegrated downstream rivais are foreclosed
from the input supplies controlled by the firm that intégrâtes". To illustrate
this définition, consider a monopolist producing an intermediate good and
selling it to several downstream firms competing à la Cournot on the final
market. If the monopolist is vertically integrated into the downstream in-
dustry, it refuses to supply its non-integrated rivais and monopolizes the
final market1.
The extension of the theory of vertical foreclosure to successive oligo-
poly models is far from straightforward and constitutes a very controversial
issue. In this article, we consider, like Ordover. Saloner and Salop (1990),
an upstream symmetric Bertrand duopoly and, as regards the downstream
* I am grateful to D. Encaoua, A. Perrot, P. Rey, J.-P. Ponssard, C. Barlet and two anonymous référées for
helpful commente on earlier versions of the paper.
** Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, Boulevard de l'hôpital, 75647 ParisCedex 13. France, e-mail :
avenel @ univ-paris1 f r
1 This type of foreclosure is illustrated by several antitrust cases. In an Australian case, Queensland Wire
Industries (Xi.WJ") Proprietary Limited v. The Broker) Hill Proprietary ("B.H.P") Company LJmited and
another (1989), Judge Deane sums up the facts as follows : "Hère, B.H.P. has refused, otherwise than at an
unrealistically high price, to supply the appellant ("Q.W.I.") with a steel product ("Y-bar") produced by B.H.R's
roliing mills. [...] The explanation of B.H.P.'s effective refusai to supply Y-bar to Q.W.I. is that there is no other
local producer or wholesaler of Y-bar and B.H.P. desires to prevent Q.W.I. from manufacturing and selling
star picket fencing posts (produced from Y-bar) in compétition with the second respondent ("A.W.I."), which
is a wholly owned subsidiary of B.H.P."
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industry, a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated goods2. Under thèse as-
sumptions, there is no double-marginalization in the absence of vertical
intégration3 and the profitability of vertical intégration completely relies on
stratégie anticompetitive efFects. The key point in such models is to assert
whether vertical foreclosure takes place under partial vertical intégration
and whether this structure émerges as an equilibrium of a properly defined
merger game. Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) claims that foreclosure
émerges in equilibrium as long as the integrated firm can commit on the in-
termediate price it offers. This is équivalent to assuming that the integrated
firm is a Stackelberg leader. However, it is not clear why it should be so, as
Reiffen (1992) and Hart and Tirole (1990) pointed out. It is ail the less clear
as it is profitable for the firm to deviate from the foreclosure strategy and
sell a small, positive amount of intermediate good. Such déviation opportu-
nities destroy any market equilibrium but the market equilibrium obtained
without vertical intégration. Vertical intégration has no impact on market
priées in this model unless one assumes a particular commitment capability
for integrated firms. In the présent paper, we claim that this unsatisfactory
resuit is due to the fact that integrated firms are (implicitly) assumed to
be similar to non-integrated firms as regards the technology they use. We
show that the introduction of a technological choice in the model solves the
commitment problem. Indeed, an integrated firm can commit to foreclosure
by adopting a technology that is not compatible with the technology used
by non-integrated firms. This choice can be profitable and constitute an
equilibrium strategy.
More precisely, we claim that there is a fundamental différence bet-
ween integrated and non-integrated firms as regards the technological choice.
Whereas non-integrated firms can only use the technology based on the
standard intermediate good traded on the market - we call "standard" this
technology -, integrated firms can also adopt a technology based on an
intermediate good différent from the standard intermediate good and. for
some reason, not compatible with the standard technology - we call '"non-
standard" such a technology. If the incompatibility is so strong that the
non-standard good cannot be adapted to the standard technology, the adop
tion of a non-standard technology implies that the integrated firm will not
participate to the intermediate market and, thus, will foreclose its downs-
tream rivais. However, the degree of incompatibility needs not be so strong
and we consider the more gênerai situation where it is possible to adapt the
non-standard good to the standard technology. Of course, this adaptation is
costly and this cost is a measure of the degree of incompatibility. Introducing
the distinction between standard and non-standard technologies in a model
that is otherwise relatively close to Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) leads
2 In this respect, our model is similar to Colangelo (1995), but Colangelo examines the very différent issue
of the pre-emptive nature of intégration in a model where both vertical and horizontal intégration can occur.
For a comment on this paper, see Avenel (1996).
3 For an analysisof vertical foreclosure in a model with double-marginalization, see Salinger( 1988), Schrader
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to a very significant change in the analysis and allows us to establish a set
of conditions for the émergence of vertical foreclosure in equilibrium in the
absence of any particular assumption as regards the commitment capability
of integrated firms. In particular, we don't assume that integrated firms can
commit to the price they charge on the intermediate market.
The article is organized as follows. After the présentation of the mo
del (section 2). we show (in section 3) that, as well as the adoption of a
non-standard technology leads to the foreclosure of downstream rivais, the
converse is true, that is, if an integrated firm adopts the standard technology,
it doesn't foreclose its downstream rivais4. This point being established. it
remains to see whether integrated firms indeed adopt a non-standard tech
nology and whether partial intégration with adoption of a non-standard
technology occurs in equilibrium. This is done in section 4. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 The model
The model is a four stage game. In the first stage, both pairs of upstream-
downstream firms can merge. Then, in stage 2, integrated firms (if there is
any) hâve to choose between adopting the standard technology or a non-
standard technology. After stage 2, the structure of the industry is deter-
mined. In stage 3, non-integrated upstream firms and integrated firms com
pete in price on the intermediate market. Finally, in stage 4, non-integrated
downstream firms and integrated firms also compete in price. This section is
devoted to a more detailed présentation of the différent stages of the game
and of the distinction between standard and non-standard technologies.
2.1 Stage 1 : Merger game
We dénote upstream and downstream firms respectively by {Ui)i=l2 and
{Di)j=l 2. In this stage, each pair of firms, ({/,-, Di) décides whether to merge
or not. Clearly, the upstream firm can make a profitable and acceptable mer
ger offer to the downstream firm, and vice versa, if and only if the merger
increases their joint-profits. We do not model the negotiations between ups
tream and downstream firms, but assume that they are efficient, so that
intégration occurs if and only if the profit of the integrated structure is hi-
gher than the separated firms' joint-profits, both profits depending on the
rivais' décision. As a conséquence, stage 1 is a two-players game. There is
a positive intégration cost, denoted by I, which represents both légal costs
4 This may not be true if an integrated firm is subject to a capacity constraint or, more generally, if the marginal
cost of producing the intermediate good increases when the output increases. However, as most articles in
this fteld, we ignore this issue and assume a constant marginal cost of production.270 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(3), 2000
and the costs generated by the réduction of the subordinate managers in
centives.
After stage 1, there are four possible structures for the industry : iV7
(no intégration), FI (full intégration) and Pl^i = 1,2 (partial intégration
by Ux and Di). We dénote by F» the resuit of a merger between Ux and Dt.
2.2 Stage 2 : Technology adoption
We distinguish between a "standard" technology and "non-standard" tech
nologies. The standard technology is based on an intermediate good com-
monly traded on the market. Due to the existence of this market, the assets
used in the production and the transformation of the (standard) interme
diate good are not spécifie to a particular commercial relation. The stan
dard technology can thus be adopted by both integrated and non-integrated
firms. To the contrary, because of the incompatibility of a particular non-
standard intermediate good with the standard technology and with other
non-standard technologies, the assets used in the production and the trans
formation of this good are spécifie to the commercial relation between the
upstream firm that produces the good and the downstream firm that trans-
forms the good into the final good. As a conséquence, we assume that,
due to the incomplète nature of contracts, the adoption of a non-standard
technology is possible only for vertically integrated firms.
Our approach of the technological choice of firms relies on empirical
facts collected from several industries and, notably, from the pulp and paper
industry. The production of paper is essentially a two-steps process. In the
first step, pulp is produced from wood or recycled paper. In the second step,
it is transformed into paper. If the production of pulp and the production
of paper take place at différent locations, which is common, the pulp, that
initially is a liquid, must be transformed into (dry) "market pulp". There is a
worldwide market on which upstream and downstream firms, some of them
integrated, some others not, trade market pulp. If the pulp and the paper are
produced at the same location, which is also common5, the pulp is treated in
its liquid form and market pulp plays no rôle in the process. Of course, the
requirement that pulp and paper are produced at the same location induces
a site specificity of upstream and downstream assets. Vertical intégration
is the rule for firms using this technology. Clearly, market pulp and liquid
5 In the récent period, there has been a trend toward more integrated plants in the pulp and paper industry.
There is no doubt that the évolution of transportation costs and tariffs, as well as the development of the
use of recycled paper in the production of pulp explain for a large part this trend, but it is also clear that
firms are aware of the stratégie implications of this évolution. In particular. it is clearly not favorable to non-
integrated downstream firms. More generaily, technological choices resuit from many effects that are not
only stratégie. Essentially. non-standard technologies may be more efficient. Our point is that even if the
adoption of a non-standard technology is motivated by the désire to lower costs, it also has a stratégie effect
on the commercial relations between the integrated firms and the other firms. This effect must be taken
into account in the évaluation of non-standard technologies. This is what we focus on in this article, thus
abstracting from potential efficiency gains.Eric Avenel 271
pulp respectively satisfy our définition of a standard and a non-standard
interniediate good.
As the standard technology is the technology that non-integrated firms
use, an integrated firm that adopts this technology can either buy (and use)
or sell the standard intermediate good just as non-integrated firms do. This
is not the case with a non-standard technology. Indeed, the intermediate
good associated with a non-standard technology is not adapted to the stan
dard technology. As a conséquence, a non-integrated downstream firm wil-
ling to use a non-standard good has to adapt it to the standard technology6.
We assume that this adaptation induces a unit cost (denoted by S). In the
same way, an integrated firm using a non-standard technology could use the
standard intermediate good after adapting it, but this opportunity plays no
rôle in our analysis, because it cannot be profitable for an integrated firm7.
As a conséquence, we just need to consider the possibility for non-integrated
downstream firms to purchase, adapt and use a non-standard intermediate
good.
Except for the adaptation cost, we assume that the variable cost of
producing the intermediate good and the final good is the same for the
standard technology and for non-standard technologies. However, we allow
for a différence in the fixed costs. Normalizing the fixed cost associated with
the standard technology to zéro, we dénote by E the fixed cost associated
with non-standard technologies. As E is in fact the différence between two
fixed costs, it may be positive or négative. However, we just consider the
more interesting case where E is positive8.
We assume that the technological choice is observable and irréversible,
so that the type of technology used by integrated firms is common knowledge
in the following stages of the game.
2.3 Stage 3 : Upstream compétition
Compétition on the intermediate market is à la Bertrand. The standard in
termediate good is homogeneous and, once a non-standard good has been
adapted to the standard technology, it is a perfect substitute of the stan-
6 Note that we could distinguish between two possibilities as regards the firm that supports the adaptation cost
when an integrated firm using a non-standard technology supplies a non-integrated downstream firm. We
think that it strongly varies across industries, but in our model, given our assumption of Bertrand compétition
on the intermediate market, the two possibilities are équivalent. In both cases, the total cost for a non-
integrated firm of purchasing one unit of good from the integrated firm and transforming it into the final good
isô + rn, where m is the integrated firm's price-cost rnargin on the intermediate market. We assume without
loss of generatity that the downstream firm supports the cost.
7 Such purchases would just rise the downstream cost. compared to the use of internally produced interme
diate good.
8 As the adoption of a non-standard technology increases the gross profit of an integrated firm facing non-
integrated competitors and leaves unchanged the gross profit of an integrated firm facing an integrated
competilor, it would émerge in ail equilibriums in stage 2 if the différence E in fixed costs was in favor of
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dard good9. Upstream firms, either integrated or not, hâve the same mar
ginal cost, which is constant, equal to zéro. Integrated downstream firms
thus procure internally at zéro cost, whereas non-integrated downstream
firms rely on the intermediate market, thus paying w = min(t>i,U2) for the
intermediate good, where V{ is the price offered by £/*.
2.4 Stage 4 : Downstream compétition
Downstream firms sell differentiated (substitute) goods. The stratégie varia
bles are the priées, (pi)i=i 2- There are no downstream variable costs other
than the price for the input and the eventual adaptation cost.
We consider the following demand functions :
Qi = a - pi + ypj ; i = 1,2 ; i ^ j ; a > 0 ; 0 ^ 7 < 1 (1)
We restrict our attention to substitute goods, because foreclosure is
not an issue for complément goods. Indeed, the logic of foreclosure is that
reducing compétition on the intermediate market leads to an increase in
the intermediate price and thus in non-integrated downstream firms' costs.
Those firms increase their price and. when goods are substitutes, this in-
creases the demand for the integrated firm's good. To the contrary, when
goods are compléments, then downstream firms don't hâve an incentive to
rise their rival's price, as this reduces the demand for their own good and
finally reduces their profit. Foreclosure thus cannot be a profitable strategy.
3 Foreclosure and the standard technology
In this section, we briefly présent the equilibrium that obtains on the inter
mediate and the final market in the absence of intégration and the equili
brium that obtains when just one pair of firms is integrated and uses the
standard technology. We show that thèse two structures are just one and
the same as regards market stratégies in equilibrium.
3.1 No Intégration
Both downstream firms are independent and rely on the intermediate mar
ket. Their marginal cost is thus equal to the price w they pay for the in
termediate good. As regards the détermination of u\ Bertrand compétition
9 As integrated firms hâve no incentive to trade with each other in this model (each firm produces the inter
mediate good at zéro cost). we don't examine the issue of the adaptation of a non-standard good to another
non-standard technology.Eric Avenel
leads to i'i = t'2 = 0. Upstream firms make no profit and downstream profits
are given by
2
3.2 Partial Intégration with a standard technology
We now consider the situation where the pair of firms ([/*, Di) is integrated
and uses the standard technology. £>* procures internally at zéro cost, while
Dj relies on the intermediate market, supporting the intermediate price w.
Downstream priées are given by
Determining the quantities is straightforward :
9i(w)=pi(w) (5)
„(») - PJ(») - » - j§7 + (2T2
It is interesting for what follows to note that, whereas the effect of an
increase in w on the joint profits of Uj and Dj is not clear-cut, it appears
that. for a given w, Uj and Dj as a whole are better off when goods are
closer substitutes10, because the price increase is more important and the
quantity decrease is less. They thus hâve a lower incentive to proceed to a
"reactive" merger.
Let us now détermine the intermediate price. F^s profit is the sum
of downstream and upstream profits. On the downstream market, F, makes
a profit equal to Pi(w)qi(w). On the final market, it makes a profit only if
Vi ^ Vj. Otherwise, there is no demand addressed to F{. To the contrary, if
Vi < Vj. the entire demand is addressed to F{, which makes a profit equal
to wqj(w). Finally, if Vi = Vj, jDj's demand is shared between Ui and Uj
according to a rule (a; 1 —a), with 0 < a < 1. As a whole, F,'s profit is
given by :
7TF, = pi(w)qi(w) + wqj(w)lVi=U)<Vj + awqj{w)lVi=w=Vj - I (7)
10 Of course, it doesn't necessarily mean that non-integrated firms are better of for close substitutes than
for relatively independeni goods. Indeed, determining the total effect of 7 on non-integrated firms' profits
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Contrary to F*, Uj is présent only on the intermediate market. It
makes a profit equal to
■wqj{w)lVj=w<Vi + (1 - a)wqj(w)lVj=w=Vi (8)
Clearly, there is no equilibrium such that 0 < V{ = w < Vj. Indeed,
Uj makes no profit and can get a positive profit by deviating and offering
v'j G]0; Vi[. The point is that there is also no equilibrium such that 0 < Vj =
w < Vi. Indeed, in such a situation, Fi gets
m
Offering v[ = w(l — e), with e arbitrarily small, Fi gets
(10)
The first part of (10) is F<'s downstream profit, which is slightly reduced,
and the second part of (10) is the profit that F, makes on the intermediate mar
ket by getting D/s demand. This is obviously a profitable déviation. The same
argument explains why there is no equilibrium such that w = v\ = Vj > 0. To the
contrary, w = 0 clearly is an equilibrium for stage 3. Indeed. both firms make no
profit on the intermediate market, but none of them has a profitable déviation.
w = 0 is thus the unique equilibrium. Note that it is similar to the equilibrium
we found in the preceding subsection, with no intégration at ail.
3.3 Conclusion
The results of this section show that there is nothing like foreclosure under partial
intégration in this model if the integrated firm adopts the standard technology.
Fj engages in upstream compétition, although this, in the end, makes intégration
unprofitable, because it cannot resist the temptation of serving D/s demand.
This leads us to the conclusion that foreclosure, in this model, can only resuit
from the adoption of a non-standard technology or, in other words, that, absent
the technological choice, no vertical foreclosure can arise.
What is more, vertical foreclosure will hâve a significant impact only if a
pair of firms remains non-integrated. Indeed, the différent types of FI structures
are similar to the NI structure as regards market equilibrium, no matter what
technology the two integrated firms adopt. Two firms that hâve access to their
intermediate good at a zéro price compete on the final market, just as under Ar7.
They thus offer the same priées for the final good and sell the same quantities.
making the same (gross) profits. The différence between FI and NI is just in
the way upstream and downstream firms share the profits. One should also notice
that, under FI, both firms adopt the standard technology in stage 2. as adopting
a non-standard technology induces a supplementary cost. but doesn't increase the
gross profit, thus reducing the net profit.Eric Avenel 275
4 The complète model
Given the results of the previous section, we just hâve to solve the market com
pétition stages for the "PI with a non-standard technology" structure. In a first
step, we assume that the adaptation cost is low and détermine the market equili
brium. This allows us to détermine the impact of the adoption of a non-standard
technology on the différent firms' profits and to evaluate the profitability of this
technology for an integrated firm facing non-integrated competitors (section 4.1).
Then, we solve the first stage of the game and show that partial intégration with
foreclosure émerges as the unique equilibrium over a large range of values of the
parameters (section 4.2). In a second step, we treat the case of a high adapta
tion cost and show that a minimal degree of substitutability between final goods
is required for vertical foreclosure to émerge (section 4.3). Finally, we propose a
synthesis of the results (section 4.4).
4.1 Does foreclosure émerge under partial intégration ?
Suppose that in stage 1, £/, and Di merge, while Uj and Dj stay separate. and
that Fi adopts a non-standard technology. Priées and quantities are given by (3),
(4). (5) and (6), where w is determined by price compétition between b\ and Uj
on the intermediate market. Because l/t- produces the intermediate good with a
non-standard technology, Uj has an advantage on this rival. Indeed, whereas Dj
can use the good produced by Uj without any cost other than the unit price v}
payed to Uj, it is not the case for the good produced by b\. Dj has to adapt
this good to the standard technology, with a cost of transformation of S per
unit. As a conséquence. Dj compares Vj and v, + 6 when choosing its supplier.
The integrated firm's upstream profit is thus11 wqj(w)lVi+s=w<vj, whereas its
downstream profit is pi(w)qi(w), and L'j's (upstream) profit is wqj(w)lVj^w^,i+s-
Bertrand compétition thus leads to w = Vj = 5, the non-integrated upstream
firm supplying the non-integrated downstream firm at a unit price 6, at least as
long as S is inferior to the price i* that Uj would charge as a monopolist, which
we assume to hold in this and the following subsections. Any price Vj > 6 would
create an opportunity for Fi to capture Dj 's demand and make profits by charging
Vi e]ô:vj[. Any price Vj < 6(< v*) is suboptimal for Uj which can increase its
profit by rising Vj without offering F, the opportunity to capture Dj's demand.
As a conséquence, firms' profits are given by
(«)
WeassumethatDj'sdemandisentirelyaddressedtothenon-integratedfirmwhenvi+rf = Vj. Considering
a more gênerai sharing rule would lead to the resuit that Uj charges a price equal to 8~, inftnitely close,
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Recall that, if the integrated firm adopts the standard technology, it makes
the profit 7r£.7' given by
-/ (15)
The comparison of thèse two profits leads to
Lemma 1 Under Pli, assuming that 6 < v*, Fi adopts a non-standard technology
if and only if
ô> E- 1 (16)
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Figure 1 (a = 1 and 7 = 0.5)
In particular, for E = 0, the adoption of a non-standard technology is
profitable if and only if 8 > 0. Indeed, this adoption is a costless rising rivais cost
strategy. For E > 0, the adoption of a non-standard technology is costly and is
optimal only if it générâtes a sufficient increase in gross profits.
If condition (16) is not satisfied. partial intégration is not an equilibrium as
intégration has a cost /, but does not lead to an increase in the joint-profits of the
merging firms. The structure characterized by the absence of vertical intégration is
the only equilibrium. Because we focus on the question of the émergence of vertical
intégration in equilibrium, we assume that condition (16) is satisfied. Foreclosure
thus émerges under partial intégration. Of course, the question of the émergence
of partial intégration in equilibrium remains.Eric Avenel 277
4.2 Does partial intégration émerge in equilibrium ?
In order to détermine the Xash equilibrium of stage 1. we define / and g by
One can easily check that / is just the différence between the profit of the
integrated firm using a non-standard technology in a partial intégration structure
and the joint-profits of a pair of upstream-downstream firms under NI. It is thus
the (gross) incentive for a pair of firms to deviate from the AT structure, integrate
and adopt a non-standard technology. For this déviation to be profitable, / must
be more than the cost of integrating and adopting a non-standard technology.
that is, I + E. Note that condition (16) can be rewritten as /(a, 7, S) > E.
Similarly, g is the (gross) incentive for non-integrated foreclosed firms to
merge. It is the différence between the profit of an integrated firm in a FI structure
and the joint-profits of a non-integrated pair of upstream-downstream firms facing
an integrated competitor using a non-standard technology. It is thus the incentive
for the Uj — D3 pair of firms to deviate from the PU structure when condition
(16) is satisfied. For this déviation to be profitable, g must be more than /, as the
firm Fj will adopt the standard technology, which is less costly than non-standard
technologies.
Proposition 1 Assuming thaï S is low - in the sensé that it vérifies the condition
5 < v* - and that condition (16) is satisfied, the structure of the industry in
equilibrium is given by :
PI with a non-standard technology if and only if f(a,'y,S) — E > I > g(a,iy.S),
NI if and only if I ^ f(a, 7, S) - E,
and
FI if and only if I ^ g(a, 7, S).
Proof. Writing the equilibrium conditions for the merger game leads to the pro
position.
Note that the condition for partial intégration with foreclosure to émerge
in equilibrium implies (16), so that (16) can be omitted in the conditions for the
émergence of partial intégration as an equilibrium. However, condition (16) is an
essential part of the conditions for the émergence of the other structures. Recall
that if condition (16) is not satisfied, NI is the unique equilibrium of the game.
Note also that for any (/, E) at least one of the conditions in proposition 1
is satisfied, so that there is always an equilibrium in pure stratégies for the merger
game.
There remains the question of whether partial intégration with foreclosure.
when it is an equilibrium, is the unique equilibrium. Comparing the différent
conditions in proposition 1 leads to the following resuit.
Corollary 1 // PI with foreclosure is an equilibrium, it is the unique equilibrium.
Finally, we hâve to verify that the condition given in proposition 1 for the
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least a part of the range of the parameters. Note that as soon as f(a, 7.6) >
g(a,'y,6), there exists a range of values of / and E for which PI with a non-
standard technology is an equilibrium. It is thus essential to compare / and g. It
is straightforward to establish that /(a, 7,5) > p(a,7. S) if and only if12
f (20)
Recall that we assumed the condition 8 < v* to be satisfied. so that, at this
point of our analysis, we hâve shown that for any (a, 7, S) such that 5 < w and
S < v*, there exists a range of values of / and E such that PI with a non-standard
technology is an equilibrium of the game. It is then the unique equilibrium of the
game.
4.3 High cost non-standard technologies
A complète resolution of the game requires us to examine the situation where
5 5s v*. Under this assumption, the intermediate price is given not by 6 but by
v* in the "PI with a non-standard technology" structure. Up to this (essential)
change, the analysis is similar to the previous one.
We calculate firms' profits by replacing w with the expression of v' in (3),
(4), (5) and (6) (see appendix A). The characterization of the industry structure
depending on the parameters' values is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assuming that S is high (ô ^ v*) and that f*(a,-)) > E, the
structure of the industry in equilibrium is given by :
PI with a non-standard technology if and only i//"(a,7) - E > I > g"(a. 7)..
NI if and only if I ^ /'(a, 7) - E,
and
FI if and only if I < g*(a.7)..
with /"(a, 7) = f{a..y,V) and g*(a,7) = c/(a,7,u').
The condition /'(a,7) > E ensures that an integrated firm facing non-
integrated rivais finds it profitable to adopt a non-standard technology. It is just
condition (16) with <5 replaced by v'. Note also that if partial intégration is an
equilibrium, it is the unique equilibrium of the game.
To complète the resolution, we hâve to compare /*(a,7) and g' (a, 7). It is
not a surprise to find that f*(a, 7) > g*(a,7) if and only if w* < w. Furthermore,
numerical calculations allow us to establish that there exists a positive value 7 ôf
7 comprised between 0.39 and 0.40 such that v* < w if and only if 7 > 7- This
leads us to the conclusion that, for 7 > 7, there exists a range of values of (/, E)
such that PI with foreclosure is the unique equilibrium of the game. The price
on the intermediate market is then equal to v*. To the contrary, if 7 < 7, there is
not value of / and E such that partial intégration is an equilibrium. Thèse results
confirm the intuition developed in section 3 that close substitutability of the goods
offered on the final market is favorable to the émergence of partial intégration and
foreclosure.
12 As soon as S ^ îïï, Uj can make a profitable and acceptable offer to Dj and a reactive merger occurs.
Alternatively. Dj also can make a profitable and acceptable ofier 1o Uj. See section 2.1.Eric Avenel 279
4.4 Equilibrium industry structure
To sum up, partial intégration with the adoption of a non-standard technology. in
other words partial intégration with foreclosure, is the unique equilibrium of the
game defined in section 2 in the following three cases :
(i) 7^7, S <w and f(a,i,Ô) - E > />ff(o,7,<5).
The price on the intermediate market is then equal to ô.
(ii) 7 > 7, ô > v* and f*(a,^) - E > I > g'ia,^).
The price on the intermediate market is then equal to v*.
(iii) 7 > 7, ô < v* and /(a, 7,5) - E > I > 5(0.7, ô).
The price on the intermediate market is then equal to 5.
In the three cases, priées and quantities on the final market are deduced
from (3), (4), (5) and (6).
When 7^7 and ô ^ w. both 6 and v* make a reactive merger profitable
and vertical foreclosure cannot émerge in equilibrium.
No matter what value the differentiation parameter takes, there exists a
range of values of S such that if non-standard technologies are characterized by
an adaptation cost within this range, partial vertical intégration with adoption of
a non-standard technology is the unique equilibrium, as long as / and E satisfy
given conditions. Roughly speaking, E must be sufficiently low and / must be
neither to low nor to high. Only the combination of a high adaptation cost and a
low degree of substitutability between final goods can make an equilibrium with
vertical foreclosure impossible, in the sensé that no value of E and / supports this
equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
In our model, the question whether integrated firms foreclose their non-integrated
rivais is équivalent to the question whether they adopt a non-standard technology.
that is. a technology that doesn't allow them to produce the intermediate good
in its standard form so that, if they supply non-integrated downstream firms, the
good must be adapted to the standard technology. In equilibrium, non-integrated
firms using a non-standard technology don't supply non-integrated downstream
firms. In other words, the adoption of a non-standard technology induces the
foreclosure of downstream rivais. To the contrary, if integrated firms adopt the
standard technology, no foreclosure occurs. The stratégie effect of vertical intégra
tion is thus fully determined by the technological choice of vertically integrated
firms. This idea is in accordance with the empirical facts presented in the article.
What is more, we show that partial intégration with foreclosure occurs in
equilibrium over a broad range of values of the substitutability parameter and
the adaptation cost. Since vertical séparation is, in this model, socially optimal,
as vertical intégration only can rise intermediate and final priées, our results are
in favor of a strict control of vertical intégration. However, it is quite risky to
base recommendations for compétition policy on a model that doesn't consider
some important aspects of vertical intégration, notably efficiency gains, but rather
aims at pointing out the stratégie aspects of vertical intégration. However, since
our model is analytically quite simple, we think that it can constitute a good
basis for further developments and we are confident that the idea of a tight link280 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(3), 2000
between foreclosure and non-standard technologies could profitablv be used in
various theoretical settings.
6 Appendix A
It is straightforward to show that Uj 's profit maximization in stage 3 leads to
Vi = V —
2(2-
Calculating the profits leads to
7 \ -I-E (22)
^ -\2-jJ V 2(2-72)
.2
(23)
If the integrated firm adopts the standard technology, it gets
vPJi = (j^—) - I (25)
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